INTRODUCTION
It is well-established in innovation studies that the value of novel technologies is difficult to predict ex ante, especially in industries characterized by rapid technological changes (Tripsas, 1997a (Tripsas, , 1997b Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Benner & Tripsas, 2012) . To keep abreast of competition, firms must continually reconfigure their technological portfolios, entering emerging technologies within the "window of learning" and exiting obsolete ones (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Eggers, 2012 Eggers, , 2015 Suarez,Grodal & Gotsopoulos, 2015) . Yet, firms often delay exit from obsolete technologies even when new ones prove to perform significantly better. As late as 2007, Kodak's management released a video stating that Kodak had decided to keep investing in traditional photography and not to "play grab ass anymore with digital" (Barabba, 2011) . In a similar vein, firms often miss valuable technological opportunities, even when they have in-house relevant technological knowledge. For instance, IBM ran into severe troubles decades ago because it did not pursue development of small computers despite competitors highlighted the attractiveness of those markets (Mills & Friesen, 1996) .
Inefficient information-processing in organizations and its effects on firms' decisionmaking constitute a central problem in both strategy and organization research. In 1963, Cyert & March (p. 21) 
asked: "What happens to information as it is processed through the organization?
What predictable biases are there in an organization? Attempts to address this question have been abundant but highly fragmented. One line of research suggests that organizational structure -which acts as a conduit for the translation and diffusion of information in a firm and determines the allocation of organizational attention -affects firms' choices and quality of their decisions (e.g. Sah & Stiglitz, 1986; Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Csaszar, 2012) . Another line has underscored the importance of cognitive frames in determining the allocation of organizational attention to an opportunity and the subjective conceptualization of its value and desirability in firm's context (e.g. Ocasio, 1997 Ocasio, , 2011 Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009 ).
Drawing from both these lines, this paper explores the sources of biases affecting firms' internal selection of technological opportunities. In line with recent studies (Reitzig & Sorenson, 2013; Criscuolo, Dahlander, Grohsjean & Salter, 2016) , we aim to provide an account of how ideas and projects originating within the organization are evaluated, shedding light on the factors leading to two type of selection errors (Garud, Nayyar & Shapira, 1997; Csaszar, 2012) . We investigate under which conditions, firms decide to retain low value technological opportunities, thereby making a "commission error", and dismiss the high value ones, making an "omission error". In line with the research on organizational cognition, we argue that if an opportunity fits into the predominant technological frames in an organization, it is salient to the decision-makers even if its objective potential may be low. Conversely, an opportunity that does not fit with the predominant frames shared collectively in the organization is more likely to be abandoned or rejected even when the underlying technology is promising.
Based on these premises, we propose that decision-makers will be more likely to make commission errors in evaluating technological opportunities generated by the central inventors in intra-organizational network or by inventors located in central R&D locations, because they can influence the predominant technological frames held collectively by the organizational members.
By contrast, socially or geographically peripheral inventors are less effective in forming or influencing the predominant technological frames in the organization. Hence, the opportunities they generate are more prone to omission errors -i.e. more likely to be disregarded irrespective their objective value. sample of established industry players. Mobile phone and PDA is a technology-intensive, dynamic industry, which witnessed instances of technological disruptions and incumbent-failures in the given time-frame. We operationalize technological opportunities available to a firm in terms of its patented innovations. To capture firms' opportunity-selection decisions, we use patent renewal data (Lanjouw, Pakes & Putnam, 1998; Bessen, 2009; Serrano, 2010) . We measure errors in terms of deviations from the optimal decision based on patent value indicators (Griliches, 1990; Trajtenberg, 1990; Bessen, 2008) . The results support both sets of hypotheses.
This paper adds to the cognitive approaches to strategy. First, our study extends and generalizes prior findings illustrating the role of cognition in technology selection by organizations (Gavetti, 2012; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Tripsas, 2009; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) . We complement these studies, which were mostly conceptual or qualitative in nature, with quantitative analyses illustrating the sources of commission and omission errors in an organization (Garud et al, 1997; Csaszar, 2012) . Thus, our findings provide an illustration of how cognitive biases inhibits a firm from leading and responding to technological disruptions even when it possesses the relevant knowledge assets (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015) . Our paper also contributes to research on organizational design, especially pertaining to the corporate R&D (Tsai, 2001; Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005) . This line of research shows how network centrality and colocation enhance the performance and social influence of the core inventors. We illustrate how these benefits come at an organizational cost as centrality and co-location, at the same time, engender strong selection biases and thereby severely limit firm's ability to pursue optimal R&D opportunities, especially during technological disruptions.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Errors in Internal Selection of Technological Opportunities
Technological opportunities are generated and exploited in an organization through the evolutionary processes of variation, selection and retention (Baum & McKelvey, 1999; Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002) . A large, complex firm generates innovations through both "top-down" and "bottom-up" processes, which together constitute its portfolio of technological opportunities. Some of these opportunities are developed further and commercialized while others are rejected or abandoned (Burgelman, 1983a (Burgelman, , 1983b (Burgelman, , 1994 Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015) . Scholars recognized that internal selection processes shape organizations' technological trajectories (Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal & Myatt, 1994) , and that firms are exposed to the pressures of external selection when they fail to select the right technological trajectories (Singh, Tucker & House, 1986 ). Yet, it is not yet clear how organizations choose between a set of potential alternatives.
The selection and retention of an opportunity in a firm takes place broadly at two levels.
First, the top management decides, through deliberation, decides whether a technology is valuable and useful in firm's context. It may decide to continue with or discontinue a whole line of R&D (McGrath, 1997; Adner & Levinthal, 2004) , of which a certain invention makes a part (Griliches, 1990) . Second, when the middle managers, while taking strategic actions in response to market dynamics, adopt an invention in firm's products or in other value-creation processes. At both levels, if decision makers were rational, they would assess the present and future value associated to the set of options based on their current knowledge about the state of nature. On these premises, they would retain value creating technological and disband value destroying options (McGrath, 1997; Zardkoohi, 2004; Bessen, 2008) . However, managers are boundedly rational (Cyert & March, 1963; Adner & Levinthal, 2004; Barnett, 2008) and display biases in decision-making (Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015) . For instance, Reitzig and Sorenson (2013) showed that firm members undervalue systematically ideas associated with employees outside their subunit, thereby lowering the probability of adoption of those ideas, notwithstanding their quality. Thus, decision makers' behavior may deviate from value maximization (Figure 1 ).
Following prior works (Sah & Stiglitz, 1986; Csaszar, 2012) , we label such deviations as errors.
Commission errors occur when a firm selects an inferior, low value opportunity. Omission errors occur when it dismisses a superior, high value opportunity (Garud et al, 1997; Csaszar, 2012) .
How do such decisions take place and why do omission and commission errors occur?
Our answer is related to the way relevant information about technologies is interpreted in an organization. Organizations have been conceptualized as an "interpretation system", in which organizational actors interpret events and equivocal information through the processes of sensemaking and meaning infusion to the data (Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 1990) . In a complex and information-munificent environment, such processes are facilitated by the pre-existing "cognitive frame" of the actors (Goffman, 1974 ). An actor's cognitive frame has two key elements: (1) simplified, low-dimensional cognitive representations of the more complex, high-dimensional fitness landscape, and (2) mental models of causal relationships between distinct action choices and outcomes (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Walsh, 1995) . Context-specific interpretation of the information by the organizational actors, which is mediated through their pre-existing cognitive frames, forms the basis for organizations' decisions and actions (Daft & Weick, 1984; Goffman, 1974) . The frames enable the actors to enact, actively but selectively, the relevant "issues" -problems, opportunities and threats -that their firms should address, and the appropriate "answers" -organizational responses to those issues (Daft & Weick, 1984; Ocasio, 1997) .
Cognitive frames about a technology, theorized as "technological frames", represent the pre-existing conceptual understanding of the organizational actors about a technology: what it is, how it works, which problems it solves and how it performs vis-à-vis its alternatives (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008) . Such frames help actors make sense of the technology and interpret the related information (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994) . If a technological opportunity is incongruent (distant from, dissonant) with the pre-existing technological frames of key decision makers, they fail to conceptualize how to exploit the opportunity and to what end. The problems that the potential applications of such an invention or a technology can solve don't form a part of the issues or answers enacted by the organizational actors. Hence, such opportunities, despite high scientific and a correspondingly high potential economic value, are irrelevant in the context of firm's current strategy and are likely to be rejected or abandoned (Monteiro, 2015) . However, if the opportunity is congruent (proximate to, aligned) with the predominant technological frames in the organization, it is more likely to get its way to the strategic issues and answers that the key organizational actors have enacted. For this reason, inventions that resonate well with the technological frames held by organizational members, despite low scientific and potentially low economic value, become relevant in firm's strategic context, and are selected and retained.
Frames at the organizational level are not homogenous. Each actor, depending upon his own specific experience, comes to the organization with his own individual cognitive frames.
Some elements of the frames of the organizational actors may overlap while others don't.
However, due to a shared organizational context, bottom-up processing of common experiences and the social processes of interactions, collective sense-making, articulation, contestations and negotiations, these actors gradually co-evolve a shared frame at the collective level (LangfieldSmith, 1992; Rentsch, 1990) . A large, complex and diversified organization, nevertheless, has multiple, often competing individual and collective-level frames .
In the light of such diversity of frames, two related questions emerge. When a technological opportunity is to be interpreted and its selection-decision is to be taken, whose frames and interpretations are most relevant? What constitute and who shape the predominant cognitive frames at the organizational level? According to Daft & Weick (1984) , organization's interpretations are formulated by the strategic level managers. Thus, cognitive frames of the key decision-makers, who are at the top of organizational hierarchy, constitute the predominant frames in an organization. Kaplan (2008a) has empirically established an association between CEO attention to a new technology and firm's decision to invest in that technological domain.
Another line of research takes a more democratic view of organization. According to this view, strategy-making, especially under the conditions of uncertainty, can be modeled as a contest between multiple frames and interpretations Burgelman, 1983) . Framing contests have both cognitive and political dimensions. When cognitive frames of certain actors emerge as the dominant frames in the organization, the actors' power and access to resources is reinforced.
Competing actors, therefore, actively and purposely share and propagate their cognitive frames and interpretations among others in the organization and shape their frames through the practices of interaction and use of language (Goffman, 1974; .
In context of our research question, we argue that predominant frames at the organizational level are constituted by two categories of organizational actors: (1) influential inventors, who specialize in producing and understanding technologies, and have a more legitimate structural position to form and shape the technological frame at organizational level, and (2) key decision-makers, such as CEO, CTO, BU heads and product managers, who take the opportunity-selection decisions and may have their own conceptual understanding of technologies, especially in context of the markets. Hence, to be selected and retained, a technological opportunity should be interpreted valuable by both the key decision-makers and the organization at large (technology workers).
Social Coreness of Inventors and Errors in Opportunity-selection
Technology development within organizations is typically carried out by a number of individuals collaborating on multiple projects (Allen & Cohen, 1969; Tsai, 2001 ). Intraorganizational networks form the backbone of knowledge flows within the firm (Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005; Paruchuri, 2010; Carnabuci & Operti, 2013) , which profoundly affect the inventive processes and outcomes of large organizations. Inventors in a large technology firm develop an intra-organizational co-inventive or co-patenting network (Allen & Cohen, 1969; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005) . A cohesive subgroup of inventors together forms the core of such a network; peripheral inventors are loosely connected with the core ones (Borgatti & Everett, 1999) . Core inventors have high network-centrality (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008) , and consequently a superior access to others in the organization. They exhibit superior individual performance and enjoy a correspondingly high status (Ibarra, 1993; Cross & Cummings, 2004) . The combination of centrality, performance and status makes such inventors highly effective in disseminating their frames and interpretations in the co-inventive network. Prior research found that core inventors make their inventions more valuable in the organization by getting others to join and extend their own lines of R&D (Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005) . Thus, the core inventors are more capable of making their frames predominant in the firm's R&D network.
Status of the inventors plays a very important role in the evaluation of technologies and lines of R&D, especially in case of altercentric uncertainties (Podolny, 1993 (Podolny, , 2001 These conjectures resonate well with anecdotes describing R&D project selection within established firms. Royer (2003) showed that Essilor, the French maker of corrective lenses for eyeglasses, took seven years to terminate a project developing a lightweight, shatter resistant, From the discussions above, we can argue that the technological frames of core inventors are more likely to constitute or be congruent with the predominant frames in the organization. On the other hand, frames of the peripheral inventors are less likely to constitute or be congruent with the predominant technological frames at the organizational level. Core inventors are more capable of influencing the frames of key decision-makers whereas the peripheral ones are less capable. Hence, opportunities generated by the core inventors are more likely to be interpreted more valuable in the organization than those generated by the peripheral ones.
H1a: The higher the social coreness of inventors in the intra-organizational coinventing network, the more likely is the firm to make commission errors in selecting a technological opportunity generated by them.
H1b: The more peripheral are the inventors in the intra-organizational co-inventing network, the more likely is the firm to make omission error in selecting a technological opportunity generated by them.
Geographical Proximity of Inventors to Decision-makers and Errors in Opportunityselection
Although technology firms have increasingly internationalized their R&D (Granstrand, Håkanson, & Sjölander, 1993; Lahiri, 2010) , their key decision-makers are normally stationed in the global headquarters, where most crucial organizational decisions pertaining to technologies and products are taken (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Monteiro, 2015) .
Geographical proximity between actors engenders social and thereby cognitive proximity (Boschma, 2005) . Inventors, located at the firm-headquarter or a proximate location, are hence more likely to share the cognitive frame with the key decision-makers, and be more aware of and congruent with the predominant technological frames and interpretations emerging dynamically at headquarter. Opportunities generated by such inventors are, therefore, likely to be more relevant in context of the technological issues and answers that the key organizational actors have enacted (Ocasio, 1997) . In contrast, due to distinct experiences (Andersson, Forsgren & Holm, 2002 ) and a relative lack of socialization with actors at headquarter, geographically distant inventors -both individually and collectively -may evolve very different technological frames from what are dominant in the headquarter. Thus, many of their inventions, despite high scientific and potentially economic value, may be irrelevant in the eyes of key organizational decisionmakers. Monteiro (2015) shows that headquarters are indeed immune to the dissonant and unproven technologies which the geographically distant subsidiaries may have scouted.
Collocated and geographically proximate inventors are also more capable of influencing the technological frame of key organizational decision-makers than their peripheral counterparts.
Due to spatial proximity, such inventors are more likely to create direct social ties with the decision-makers, interact face-to-face with them and possibly generate deep trust (Ibarra & Andrews, 1993) . Even when they have different cognitive representations and mental models about a technological opportunity, they can sort it out through argumentation, contestation, mutual sense-making and sense-giving processes (Daft & Weick, 1984) . Iterative socialization with the decision-makers, which is essential for influencing their cognitive frames and developing their knowledge structure about an unknown domain (Burgelman, 1983; Louis & Sutton, 1991; Walsh, 1995) , is possible for the core inventors but not for the peripheral ones.
Elaborating on the same mechanisms, we reasoned that opportunities generated by the inventors located far away from firm-headquarter would be less prone to be accepted even when their quality is objectively superior to others. For geographically distant inventors, it would be more difficult to vehicle and promote their project face to face. Thus, decision makers would retain quite distinct cognitive frames, and it will a bit more difficult for decision makers to process their inventions. 
DATA AND METHOD
As recognized by Csaszar (2012: p. 618) , exploring questions concerning the type of errors that organizations make, one should ideally find a context where "all of the following must be observed: "(1) organizations making decisions about projects, (2) a measure of the quality of each project decided upon, (3) the decision that each organization made with respect to every project it faced, and (4) the social, geographic and technological core of an organization". Data on (1) and (2) abound, items 3 and 4 represent serious hurdles for the empirical researcher. First, there is typically no track record of the projects a firm started but decided not to pursue. Second, while top management data are publicly available, information regarding the formal and informal structure of an firm is not easily accessible.
In this paper, we follow prior work (Bessen, 2008; Serrano, 2010) and use a firm's patent record to overcome these hurdles. The USPTO requires an assignee to renew the patent-rights after 3.5 (4th), 7.5 (8th) and 11.5 (12th) years. At each stage, the assignee has to pay a gradually increasing maintenance fee. At each renewal request, the assignee needs to decide whether to pay the maintenance fee and keep the patent rights over the protected innovation.
To understand whether patent renewal decisions may be a good proxy of technology selection choices within established firms, we conducted four exploratory interviews. We interviewed two IP lawyers, working at the headquarters of a semiconductor handset producer and of a mobile phone company, and two IP consultants, working for a large public consortium and one for an IP consulting firm. The consultants had prior corporate experience, and are now advising a broad range of companies regarding IP portfolio management and licensing issues.
Two interviews were recorded and transcribed; for the other two, we took notes throughout the interview and transcribed the notes. We asked the informants to describe how patent renewal decisions come about, who are the actor involved, and to what extent they reflect the firms' technology strategy. Informants suggested that while significant heterogeneity and randomness characterized patent renewal in small firms, large MNCs are integrating their innovation and patenting strategies, taking a systematic approach to patent-renewal. These trends are in line with findings in the literature on corporate IP management strategies (Granstrand, 1999a, b; Hanel, 2006) . The informants also told us about differences in the structure of IP departments (also Matthews et al, 2003 in all jurisdictions that year and we prepare the plan for the following year. And here we decide these are the areas where we need to file more, these are the areas where we need to file less, we are facing problems here and we need to exit, here is where we need to develop a portfolio".
Firms in other industries have also adopted similar practices. Firms like Dow Chemical conduct "business" audit of its intellectual property, under which each BU categorizes its patents by their value (Davis, 2002) . IBM has long been regarded as the company setting "best practices" in patent portfolio management (Davis, 2002) ; its patent evaluation criteria (use, value, enforceability) are widely used by consultants in the field. One visible sign of the convergence of IP management and strategy in these context is the expanding set of responsibilities accruing to the Chief Technology Officer (CTO), who plays an important role in the selection and use of technological opportunities as well as the management of IP, facilitates such integration (Manfroy, 2002) .
This preliminary qualitative evidence validates the strategic nature of patent renewal decisions. Based on this premise, we use publicly available data on patent renewal decisions to proxy firms' technology selection decisions. If the firm renews a patent, one can infer that it has decided to retain the technological opportunity protected by the patent scope. However, if the firm doesn't renew a patent, we consider that the firm has dismissed technological opportunity protected by the patent. Beyond using renewal records to proxy technology decisions, we also use patent related data to draw information regarding the organizational structure. We use inventor's career histories to reconstruct the intra-firm collaboration networks (Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005; Carnabuci & Operti, 2013) . A tie exists between two inventors if they collaborated to a common patented project in the last three years. As an illustration, figure 2 provides a visualization of the co-patenting networks of Apple and Samsung in 2010. We also leveraged inventors' addresses to evaluate geographic location (e.g., Fleming, King III & Juda. 2007) , and patent citation and classification indicators to establish the coreness and value of technology opportunities.
-----------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here -----------------------------------Setting and Sample
We test the hypotheses in mobile phone and personal development agenda (PDA) industry . The industry-context is characterized by technological disruptions, high productmarket uncertainty and intense global competition (Lee & Lim, 2001; Kenney & Pon, 2011; Reidenberg, Russell, Price & Mohan, 2014; Vuori & Huy, 2015) . It is ideal for the study for two main reasons. First, our research question is salient and relevant in this context. The sector is innovation-led and R&D-intensive. Generation and efficient selection of technological opportunities is core to firms' performance and survival. However, industry-leaders, who made relevant inventions failed to exploit them (Kenny & Pon, 2011) . Notable instances of failure include Microsoft's inability to enter smartphones even if they developed an electronic reader back in 1998, and acquired Danger in 2008, which had a working smartphone prototype, and Nokia's submission to entrants like Apple and Google in smartphone product-segment even when it had developed the prototype of a smartphone with touchscreen in 1996 (Vuori & Huy, 2015; Phelps, 2015) . Understanding why firms dismiss promising opportunities, while committing to the ones with low value, is critical to firm success in this context. Second, the industry is ideal in terms of data availability. Mobile phone firms proactively patent their technologies worldwide, and strategically manage their patent portfolio under conditions of intense competition and resource constraints (Reitzig, 2004) . Thus, patent renewal represents a good proxy of technology decisions in this context. The industry features medium and large established firms with internationalized R&D operations and path dependent technological trajectories. Interestingly, firms vary greatly on the variables of my interest.
To create our sample, we focused on firms that launched at least five products in the mobile phone and PDA industry between 1990 and 2010. This list was created using the data on product-launch from PDAdb.net, which is world's largest online repository of smartphones, tablets, PDA, PNA and other mobile devices. We retrieved and standardized the corresponding assignee names for these firms in USPTO, and collected the complete patent record of each firm in the smartphone related patent classes from two sources: Google patents and the disambiguated Harvard patent database (Li, Lai, D'Amour, Doolin, Sun, Torvik & Fleming, 2014) . We retrieved renewal decision from Google patent database. The relevant USPTO patent classes are: 320, 341, 349, 361, 370, 375, 379, 398, 455, 704, 706, 707, 715 and 719 (Reidenberg, Russell, Price & Mohan., 2014) . Finally, we collected financial data of these firms from Compustat (WRDSCompustat North America and Global). By the end, we were left with a list of 45 firms which had product and patent data, and 24 firms that had product, patent and Compustat information.
Dependent Variable
To identify commission and omission errors, we required two kinds of data: (1) data about the decision to pursue technological opportunities by a firm, and (2) data which indicates the value of technological opportunities examined.
We used data on patent renewal decisions to proxy firms' technology selection decisions.
To measure the value of technological opportunities, we used the count of forward citation that a patent has received up to the moment when the patent was renewed, normalized by the average number of forward citations received by all patents of the same age in the same technology classes. Citation counts are an established indicator of the underlying innovation's scientific value (Griliches, 1990; Harhoff, Narin, Scherer & Vopel, 1999) . Social value of a patent (Trajtenberg, 1990) and its realized economic value (Albert, Avery, Narin & McAllister, 1991; Bessen, 2008) correlate strongly with its citation count. Indeed, according to Bessen (2008) , each additional citation that a patent receives corresponds to a 5% increase in its realized economic value.
Assuming rationality in firm's decision-making, one should expect that patent-renewal decisions reflect value of the underlying technological opportunity (Lanjouw, Pakes & Putnam, 1998; Bessen, 2008) . When a firm renews a patent which belongs to the bottom 1% of the valuedistribution by forward citation count, we count it as a commission error. An omission error occurs when the firm decides to let expire a patent which belongs to the top 10% of the valuedistribution. These asymmetric thresholds are taken because of a highly skewed distribution of the forward citation of patents -and thus of the scientific and economic value of the underlying opportunities (Griliches, 1990; Harhoff et al, 1999) . In our sample, top 10% value-distribution by citation counts has about 10% of total patents, whereas the bottom 1% value-distribution has 32% of the total patents (with 0 citations each).
Independent Variables
We measured social coreness of the team which generated a technological opportunity by looking at the position of its inventors in the intra-firm network (Nerkar & Paruchuri; Paruchuri, 2010) . In line with the theoretical arguments, our measure should reflect the access and influence that a team has within a firm. Thus, the measure should reflect both the quantity and quality of a team's contacts. Accordingly, we measured the social coreness of each patent by taking the average eigenvector centrality of its inventors (Bonacich, 1972; 1987) .
To operationalize inventors' geographical proximity to the key decision-makers in the firm, we measured the geodetic distance of inventor's location from firm-headquarter (Monteiro, 2015) . For this, we used STATA command geodist (Picard, 2012) . Location of each inventor was retrieved from Harvard Patent database, whereas the information of firms' headquarters was ascertained from Compustat and Factiva.
Control Variables
We controlled for the variables which can affect firm's estimation of patent's value and renewal decision. We included a number of patent level controls. We used the count of independent claims for each patent (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001 ) to account for the strength of protection of the patent under examination. We used the number of its subclass-assignments to control for the scope of patent protection (Lerner, 1994) and the count non-patent citations in the scientific journals to control for knowledge basicness (Harhoff, Scherer & Vopel, 2003) . Firms also exit a technology area due to crowding or competition. Thus, our models include the count of backward citations to patents assigned to other entities, which typically indicate that the inventor is operating in a crowded technological area with a number of "nearby" patents and competitors (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2001 ). We controlled for patent age (difference between patent's grant year and renewal year) to control for renewal period effects. Firms also maintain patent-rights for strategic reasons such as blocking their rivals (Barton, 2002; Harhoff et al, 2003) and creating patent-thickets (von Graevenitz, Wagner & Harhoff, 2011; Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2005) . According to Harhoff et al (2003) , at least one-third of patenting and patent-renewal is done for blocking rivals. Such patents, irrespective of their scientific value, are likely to be renewed (Moore, 2005) . Given that self-citations are often found in patents positioned around particularly important patents (and thus create patent clusters or "thickets"), we used the share of patent's backward self-citations to control for the strategic motives that may underlie patent renewal.
Large and technology-intensive firms are more likely to renew their patents (Harhoff et al, 2003; Bessen, 2008) . Large firms enjoy economies of scale and scope, have complementary resources, and hence can derive more value from the patent-rights over an innovation. Further, they tend to accumulate organizational slack and engage more in experimentation (Nohria & Gulati, 1996) . Technology-intensive firms compete by innovating: knowledge is a key organizational resource and intellectual property rights give them monopoly power. Accordingly, we controlled for firm-size (annual turnover) and its R&D expenditure. We include year dummies for each maintenance year to allow the baseline error rate to vary over time (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002) and also control for macroeconomic conditions (uncertainty, resource munificence) that could affect renewal and citation levels in the industry. As the quality of renewal decisions is affected by the cognitive burden that decision makers face, we control for the size of firm's patent portfolio. We also include R&D network size and the count of countries where a firm operate to account for the impact of organizational structure on decision making (Csaszar, 2012) . Furthermore, we included ten main class smartphone technology dummies to allow the quality of selection decisions vary across technologies.
Data Structure and Estimation Method
Our unit of analysis is patent renewal decision, which occur nested within firms. For each patent, one may observe up to three decisions, 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years after grant respectively. We use two separate random effect panel logit models to estimate the probability of omission/commission error as a function of our independent and control variables. While both random-and fixed-effects models allow for explicit consideration of the unobserved effects, the random-effects model makes an additional assumption that the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with the independent variables. Although a fixed-effects approach would require fewer assumptions than the random effects approach, it would omit all firms who do not commit errors over the observation period, which represent very relevant information given our research question. In our baseline models, we entered only the control variables. Gradually, we entered each independent variable. In separate robustness analyses, we excluded the control variables firm-size and firm's R&D expenditure, for which we retrieved data from Compustat. Notably, this data was not complete for all the years from 1990 to 2010, and the number of our observations changes by about 50%. Table 1 presents the correlation matrix of our variables. It suggests that the firms make more commission than omission errors. Overall, our model doesn't present multicollinearity concerns, which is reaffirmed by the variance inflation factors-none of which was larger than the customary threshold. Table 2 presents our preliminary results regarding the relationship between coreness and the probability of commission error. The coefficient associated to my measure of Social Coreness is positive and significant in Model 2, supporting H1a. Based on Model 3, for an increase of one unit in eigenvector centrality, the odds of commission error increase by a factor of 1.02. Model 3 introduces the variable Geographical distance, which has a negative significant effect on the probability of commission error. Thus if inventors of an opportunities are located at or are geographically proximate to firm-headquarter, the chances of commission error increase substantially, in line with what we posited in H2b. Based on Model 3, for a one-unit increase in the log of distance the odds of commission error decrease by a factor of 0.97. All patent-level controls tell stories that are interesting on their own. Patent's age has a negative effect on the probability of making commission errors, in line with arguments of technology maturity. The likelihood of commission errors decreases for strong patent, with a high number of claims, references, backward cites.
RESULTS
Insert Table 3 about here All controls here also tell stories that are interesting stories. Firms make more omission errors when they evaluate patents with a broader patent scope and team size, possibly due to the cognitive weight associated to these opportunities. The negative coefficient associated to selfcitation share indicates that decision makers are less likely to make errors when evaluating patents that have been filed for strategic reasons (blocking, thicket). Larger and older firm are more likely to make omission error, due to inertial forces. Exploratory, R&D Intensive environment are less likely to experience omission errors.
We performed some additional checks to assess the robustness of the results presented here. We repeated our preliminary analyses removing all Compustat variables to check whether significant differences exist between publicly traded and non-publicly traded companies. These models were estimated for 82,245 decisions clustered in 45 firms. Results align well with those discussed in the paper. We also ran a rare event logit given the high incidence of zero in our model. Results for both omission and commission errors are in line with those discussed above.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we began with the research question why organizations make errors in selecting their technological opportunities. What are the conditions in which the organizational decision-makers reject or abandon a valuable invention while they end up commercializing or developing one which lies at the bottom of value-distribution? The literature on attention-based view of firm suggests that organizational actors selectively and subjectively enact the relevant issues their organizations confront and the appropriate answers with which it responds to those issues. Thus, errors in internal selection indeed represent the failure of organizational actors in enacting relevant issues and answers. Enactment of organizational issues and answers involve socio-cognitive processes, and is guided partly by how the actors interpret their fitness landscape.
Drawing from the literature on cognitive frames, we argued that the interpretation and evaluation of a technological opportunity inside a firm is determined by whether it fits with the dominant technological frame at the organizational level. If the opportunity fits with the frame, it is more likely to be selected and retained -the innovation gets translated into innovation. However, if it doesn't fit the frame, it is likely to be rejected or abandoned.
We identified that the socially core inventors are more likely to shape the organizationlevel shared technological frame, and hence technological opportunities generated by them should be fitting with organization's enacted issues and answers and considered relevant and legitimate by the key decision-makers. Hence, firms are more likely to commit commission errors in selecting such opportunities. Similarly, geographically collocated and proximate inventors are more likely to share the dominant technological frame in the organization, and their inventions also should be more aligned with firm's enacted issues and answers. Conversely, opportunities generated by them should also be prone to commission errors. On the other hand, the peripheral actors, whether socially or geographically, are less likely to have the same frames as the key decision-makers in the organization. They are also least effective in shaping the collective frame at the organizational level or individual frames of the decision-makers. Hence, opportunities generated by them are more likely to be subject to omission errors.
In the empirical context of mobile phone and PDA industry (1990-2010), we found support for both the hypotheses. These results corroborate the view that the technological frame affects the internal selection of opportunities in an organization, and thereby determines the scope, innovation and performance of the firms. Interestingly, in the given period, many prominent mobile phone & PDA firms lost the competitive game and exited the industry notwithstanding their high R&D expenditure and the number of inventions they owned.
This paper makes contribution to two streams of literature. Primarily, it adds to the literature taking a socio-cognitive approach to strategy (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Gavetti, 2012; Ocasio, 1997 Ocasio, , 2011 Orlikowski & Gash, 1994) . We contribute to this area of research by shedding new light on the microfoundations of internal selection decisions in the organizations. We empirically showed that certain inventors, due to their social influence or proximity to the key decision makers, may shape the cognitive frames of key decision makers, engendering errors in technology selection. Our arguments and results also provide a more granular view of the process underlying incumbents' failure during technological disruptions (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Kapoor & Klueter, 2015 Second, our work adds to the literature on social network in innovation intensive environments (Ibarra, 1993; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005) and to studies on the design of corporate R&D activities (Tsai, 2001; Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005) . This area of research emphasizes the innovation-enhancing benefits of network centrality and colocation, as they due to a superior access of information and knowledge access, and the social influence enjoyed by the central, co-located inventors. Our paper highlights that such an advantage also has an organizational cost, as the same mechanisms funnel innovation, and engender substantial biases that prevent decision makers from making optimal selection of technological opportunities. Taken together, our results seem to suggest that the probability of errors is minimized for technological opportunities generated at intermediate distance between the core and the periphery of the organization. Coupled with prior work emphasizing the creative benefits accruing to individuals located between the core and the periphery (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008) , our findings indicate that such location may be promising to host key organizational initiatives.
This paper also has several limitations, on which we are still working. First, we need to refine the operationalization of our dependent variable further. We aim to construct a composite value index of patent value, following the approach taken by a consulting company that provides patent portfolio optimization services, where we conducted preliminary interviews. Detecting deviations from their value based assessment would provide a stronger operationalization.
Second, from interviews with IP attorneys, we knew that patent-portfolio management in firms differ substantially. We aim, if possible, to capture such differences by collecting top management and IP management partners' information. We intend to focus on the CTO as a key figure coordinating IP management and technology strategy, as emerged from our interviews. This extension can allow us a better understanding of how decision makers affect the quality of technology selection choices. We also need to work to move the empirical analyses from the current design to another that allows stronger causal inferences. Finally, to better understand selection at work, we are currently carrying our fieldwork in two directions. First, we gathered additional information regarding patent portfolio management practices. Second, we identified patents associated to projects representing instances of commission and omission errors in our dataset, and we are currently trying to gather field evidence about what underlies these projects.
These interviews will grant us more detailed insights on the theorized mechanisms. 
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